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AbstratWe study the prie of anarhy for selsh multiast routing games in di-reted multigraphs with lateny funtions on the edges, extending the knowntheory for the uniast situation, and exhibiting new phenomena not presentin the uniast model. In the multiast model we have N ommodities, wherefor eah i = 1, . . . , N , a ow from a soure si to a nite number of terminals
t1i , . . . , t
ki
i has to be routed suh that every terminal tji reeives ow ni ∈ R≥0.The ow demand of ni for eah ommodity is under the ontrol of innitelymany users (or players), eah of them ontrolling a negligible fration of itand trying to selshly nd the fastest route possible. Eah of the players anhoose from a set of strategies, whih desribe dierent routing deisions.For ommodity i, a strategy is a set of si-tji -paths (j = 1, . . . , ki). In theuniast model, ki = 1 for all i. A ow (or ation distribution) is a mappingthat assigns to eah strategy the amount of users hoosing that strategy. Avalue f(S) assigned to a strategy S in the multiast model an be realizedin two dierent ways: either every si-tji -path of the strategy arries ow





insome variants of multiast routing for linear edge latenies. We also prove alower bound of ν, so we have upper and lower bounds that are tight up to afator of 4
3
ν. Here, ν and ν∗ are network and strategy dependent parametersreeting the maximum/minimum onsumption of the network. Both are1 in the uniast ase. For edge-latenies being polynomials of degree p, wegive examples with prie of anarhy at least νp, whih in the general situ-ation with ν > 1, is an exponential inrease ompared to the Roughgardenbound of O(p/ ln p) for the uniast model. This exhibits the ontrast to theuniast ase, where we have Roughgarden's (2002) result that the prie ofanarhy is independent of the network topology. To our knowledge thispaper is the rst thorough study of the prie of anarhy in the multiast se-nario. The approah may lead to further researh extending game-theoretinetwork analysis to models used in appliations.
2
1. IntrodutionMultiast routing in ommuniation networks is a natural and pratiallyrelevant extension of the so far quite well studied uniast routing. Amongthe appliations of multiast routing are the transmission of musi, movies,onferenes, or any other popular ontent, that is requested by several us-tomers at a time. A formal desription of our multiast routing model needsmany tehnial denitions. We keep the introdution on a more informallevel and refer the reader to Setion 2 for all neessary details.Problem Formulation. An instane of selsh multiast routing on-sists of a direted multigraph G = (V, E), where the edges are also alledlinks, a set of N player lasses, alled ommodities, where ommodity i isharaterized by a soure si and terminals (or sinks) t1i , . . . , tkii , and a (ow)demand of ni ∈ R≥0. The links are eah equipped with a lateny funtion
le : R≥0 −→ R≥0. For ommodity i, a set S = {P1, . . . , Pki} where Pj is an
si-tji -path, is alled a strategy. The task is to realize for every ommodity i,a ow in the network from si to all terminals t1i , . . . , tkii , satisfying the de-mand ni for every terminal. We think of the demand as being under ontrolof innitely many players, eah ontrolling a negligible fration and selshlytrying to nd the fastest route for it. This game-theoreti model is knownas the Wardrop model.In the uniast model, ki = 1 for all i, so we have a olletion of singlesoure/single sink ommodities, and every strategy S onsists of one pathonly. In the multiast ase there are two dierent ways to route the ow
f(S) assigned to a strategy S for ommodity i: either, we route f(S) on eahpath, whih is the usual notion of ows satisfying the Kirhho onservationlaw (here shortly alled onservation ow), or we allow multiple dupliationof ow at ertain nodes: a link whih serves several, say r, terminals ina strategy, i.e., a link ontained in r paths of that strategy, only needs totransmit the data one, not r times. That is beause the data an later bedupliated to serve all terminals. In this way, the ongestion on the links anbe redued. We all suh a ow dupliation ow.The ost of a ow is dened by SC(f) = ∑S∈S lS(f)f(S), where S is theset of all strategies of all ommodities, f(S) ≤ ni is the portion of the demandthat by the deision of the selsh players has been alloated to strategy S,and lS(f) is the strategy lateny for S. We study four dierent denitionsfor lS, whih all oinide in the uniast ase. Together with the two types ofows (onservation and dupliation), we thus have 8 variants of multiast.The prie of anarhy for a multiast instane I is ρ(I) = supf SC(f)SC(f∗) , where franges over all Nash equilibria and f ∗ is an optimal ow. A Nash equilibriumis a ow in whih no player (meaning: no portion of the ow, however small)3
has an inentive to unilaterally deviate from his urrent strategy.Previous and Related Work. By the pioneering work of Roughgarden[6℄ and Roughgarden and Tardos [8℄ we know that ρ(I) in the uniast modelfor lateny funtions being polynomials of degree p, is bounded from aboveby O( p
ln p
) (and is 4
3
for p = 1). As already an example of a 2-parallel linksnetwork has a prie of anarhy of 4
3
(for p = 1), the surprising onlusion isthat it is independent of the network topology [6, Se. 3.4℄.Our Results. A solid foundation for the analysis of multiast routinggames is given in Setion 2. In Setion 2.1 we introdue a onise model, andin Setion 2.2 we show, using results on variational inequalities, the existeneof Nash equilibria.As a main result, we show in Setion 3 that the prie of anarhy in multi-ast routing may depend heavily on the network topology and the strategies.Certain edges of the graph may be utilized under ertain strategies more thanothers, although the players on those strategies are not harged for this. Onthe other hand, some strategies may depend highly on some edges but onlyontribute a small amount to their utilization. See Remark 4.1 for a moredetailed disussion of this. To apture the eets of this phenomenon, whihdoes not our in uniast routing, we introdue for eah edge and strategyan integer alled the onsumption. Moreover we introdue two new invari-ants for a graph G and a set of strategies S, whih we all maximum (resp.minimum) onsumption number, ν = ν(G, S) resp. ν∗ = ν∗(G, S). We have
ν = 1 = ν∗ in uniast routing. We show in Setion 3.3 that in two variantsof multiast for linear lateny funtions, the prie of anarhy is at most 4
3
ν2
ν∗and in Setion 3.2 provide a lower bound for one of these variants of ν (with
ν∗ = 1). So, we have here a gap of 4
3
ν.For lateny funtions being polynomials of degree p, we present (also inSetion 3.2) a multiast instane with prie of anarhy at least νp. As ingeneral ν > 1, the νp bound is exponentially larger than the orrespondinguniast bound of O( p
lnp
). This is surprising (and disappointing from thepoint of view of a ompany running the network). For instanes using theadvantages of dupliation ows in order to de-load high-lateny links, theost of the global optimum dereases drastially, but unfortunately, due toselsh behavior, the users grab (greedily) ertain links without a lookaheadand blok them out, so that the ost of the Nash equilibrium still standshigh. For other denitions of strategy lateny, in Setion 4 we are able toprove that results from non-atomi ongestion games, i.e., bounds of the form
O( p
ln p
), arry over.Open Problems. A ouple of interesting open problems arise from thispaper. For example, an the 4
3
ν fator gap between upper and lower bound4
be losed? Furthermore, is the prie of anarhy for polynomials of degree pof order O(νp), mathing the lower bound? It would also be interesting toonsider polynomial time algorithms for the omputation of equilibria.An ambitious task would be to study multiast for information ows withdupliation and oding failities of the network. Suh networks are the state-of-the-art in today's engineering designs. Our work an be onsidered as arst step in this diretion.2. Basis of Multiast Routing2.1. Model and InstanesAn instane of selsh multiast routing onsists of the following.
• A direted multigraph G = (V, E). The edges are also alled links.
• A set of N player lasses (or user lasses). Sometimes, player lassesare also alled ommodities. Eah player lass is haraterized by a demand
ni and a vetor of verties (si; t1i , . . . , tkii ), where si is the soure, and the
t1i , . . . , t
ki
i are the terminals.
• The demand ni is supposed to be routed from si to eah of the terminals
t1i , . . . , t
ki
i . We think of the demand as being under ontrol of innitely manyplayers, eah of them ontrolling a negligible amount of it. This is the well-known Wardrop model (see, e.g., [6, Se. 2.2℄), whih will beome learerwhen we dene ows and Nash equilibria below.
• Eah link e ∈ E in the graph is equipped with a lateny funtion le :
R≥0 −→ R≥0. We always assume eah lateny funtion to be non-dereasingand standard [6℄. This means that it is dierentiable and ξ 7−→ le(ξ)ξ isonvex.If an amount ξ of tra is to be routed through the link e, eah unit ofow will take le(ξ) time to traverse e. Hene we have a total lateny of le(ξ)ξon that link.
• For i ∈ [N ] = {1, . . . , N}, we all a set of paths S := {P1, . . . , Pki} where




• An ation distribution (aording to [8℄), simply alled ow, is a map
f : S −→ R≥0 suh that all the demands are met, i.e., ∑S∈Si f(S) =1Otherwise we have to treat S as a multiset.5
ni ∀i ∈ [N ]. A ow an be understood as a partition of eah of the realintervals [0, ni]. Eah of these intervals represents the ontinuum of innitelymany players of the orresponding player lass. The quantity f(S) gives, foreah S ∈ Si, the portion of demand that by the deision of the players fromthat lass is routed aording to that partiular strategy S.As desribed in the introdution, the routing of a ow in the multiastmodel an be done in two dierent ways: we an route the demand with owsin the usual sense (onservation ows) or with ows allowing dupliation(dupliation ows).
• Let e ∈ E and S ∈ S. We dene the onsumption of e under S as
c(e, S) := |{P ∈ S; e ∈ P }|, i.e., the onsumption is the number of paths in
S traversing e, or in other words, the number of terminals served via e inthis strategy.
• The ongestion fe of a link e with respet to a ow f is the amountof tra that link e has to proess. The total lateny of a link e hene is
le(fe)fe. Eah instane denes the ongestion in one of the following ways,depending on whether we have onservation ows or dupliation ows.
fe :=
{∑
S∈S(e) c(e, S)f(S) onserv. ow∑
S∈S(e) f(S) dupl. ow (1)Here, S(e) denotes the set of all strategies that ontain a path whih in turnontains e.

























S (f) := max
P∈S
lP (f)
(2)2The maximum over all links in the path has also been studied [5℄.6
An instane of selsh multiast routing inludes one of these strategy latenyfuntions.Remark 2.1. a) For uniast routing, all four denitions oinide.b) It is easy to see that lpathsS (f) = ∑e∈E(S) c(e, S)le(fe).2.2. Nash Equilibria, Soial Cost, Prie of AnarhyA ow f is alled a Nash equilibrium (sometimes abbreviated NE ), if
f(S1) > 0 =⇒ lS1(f) ≤ lS2(f) ∀S1, S2 ∈ Si ∀i ∈ [N ]. (3)Hene, in a Nash equilibrium, only minimum-lateny strategies are used,sine then no player has an inentive to hoose a dierent strategy (providedthe rest of the players keep their urrent deision). If eah lS is ontinuous(whih will be the ase during all our studies), then the game admits atleast one Nash equilibrium. This follows from the haraterization of Nashequilibria as the solutions to a ertain variational inequality (see Theorem 2.4and the disussion after that).We dene the soial ost of a ow f as SC(f) := ∑
S∈S
lS(f)f(S). The soialost aptures the overall performane of the system for a given ow f . Wewill always assume that our instanes admit a ow f ∗ with minimum soialost and that SC(f ∗) > 0. Existene is guaranteed if all lS are ontinuous(whih will be the ase in our studies), beause the set of ows is ompat.For an instane I of selsh multiast routing with optimal ow f ∗, denethe prie of anarhy by
ρ(I) := sup
f is NE SC(f)SC(f ∗) .Nash equilibria have a very simple struture, as seen in the followingproposition. The proof for this is straightforward.Proposition 2.2. Let f be a Nash equilibrium. Then, for every i ∈ [N ],there exists a real number li(f) suh that lS(f) = li(f) for all S ∈ Si,whenever f(S) > 0, and no strategy in Si has lateny less than li(f).Corollary 2.3. Let f be a Nash equilibrium. Then SC(f) = ∑i∈[N ] li(f)ni.We now aim for further haraterizations of Nash equilibria. Let f, f̃ beows. Dene SCf (f̃) := ∑S∈S lS(f)f̃(S). The rst part of the following7
theorem is well-known for the uniast ase, see, e.g., [6, Lem. 3.3.7℄ or [1℄and the referenes therein. The whole theorem also holds in a more generalontext than multiast routing, for it (and its proof) does not require thenotion of ongestion.Theorem 2.4. a) Let f be a ow. Then f is a Nash equilibrium if and onlyif we have
SC
f(f̃) ≥ SC(f) for all ows f̃ . (4)b) Let eah lS be ontinuous. Then the multiast game admits at least oneNash equilibrium.Proof. We refer the reader to the appendix for the proof of a). For b)note that (4) is equivalent to ∑S∈S lS(f)(f̃(S) − f(S)) ≥ 0 for all ows f̃ .This is a well-studied variational inequality. It has been shown in [2℄ withdeep results from the index theory of vetor elds that it admits at least onesolution. Note that all strategies from (2) are ontinuous, beause we only onsiderstandard lateny funtions and beause the ongestion is a ontinuous map-ping. Hene, all our multiast games admit at least one Nash equilibrium.In the rest of the paper we investigate the prie of anarhy for onserva-tion ows resp. dupliation ows and the four strategy latenies from (2).These are 8 ases. In Setion 3 we show for 5 of them that the prie ofanarhy depends on the network topology, while in two other ases it doesnot (Setion 4).3. Prie of Anarhy Dependent on the NetworkTopologyFor a direted graph G and a set of strategies S we dene the minimum andmaximum onsumption number as








c(e, S).We write just ν∗ and ν, if we are dealing with only one instane at a time.In a uniast situation there is only one path in eah strategy and hene







Figure 1: Example Ir,R,N . The values r and R are non-negative real numbers.
ξ denotes the lateny funtion l : ξ 7−→ ξ.3.1. Lateny lpaths avg and lmaxConsider the instane Ir,R,N in Figure 1. In this instane, we have N + 1player lasses, all sharing the soure s.
• For eah i ∈ [N ], player lass i has one terminal ti. The demand is r,for a xed r ∈ R≥0.
• Player lass N + 1 has N terminals t1, . . . tN . This lass has demand
R, R ∈ R≥0 xed.There are two links between s and eah ti, one with onstant lateny r + Rand one with lateny funtion l : ξ 7−→ ξ. Dening a strategy in this examplefor player lass N + 1 means piking for eah ti either the ξ-link or the linkwith onstant lateny. Conservation ows and dupliation ows oinide,sine eah strategy onsists of edge disjoint paths.Theorem 3.1. By hoosing r suiently small and R and N suientlylarge, the prie of anarhy in the example in Figure 1 an be made arbitrarilyhigh (although we still have linear lateny funtions). More preisely, wehave for large N
ρ(Ir,R,N) ≥ (1 +
R
r
)(1 − o(1)).This holds for all four ombinations of onservation ows and dupliationows on the one hand, and lpaths avg and lmax on the other hand.Proof. Let f be the ow where all players from all lasses hoose the linkswith lateny funtion ξ 7−→ ξ. We then have lpaths avgS (f) = r + R for allstrategies S. The same holds for lmax. Hene, f is a Nash ow for lpaths avgand lmax. By Corollary 2.3 we have SC(f) = (∑i∈[N ](r + R)r)+(r+R)R =9
t1 t2 t3 t4 tktk−1
l(ξ) = ξp
l(ξ) = 0
sFigure 2: The links in the upper path an be used in both diretions andhave lateny 0.
Nr(r+R)+(r+R)R. For omparison, take f̃ as the ow in whih all playersfrom lasses 1 to N stik to the ξ-links, but all players from lass N + 1 takethe links with onstant lateny r + R. We then have (for lpaths avg and lmax)
SC(f̃) =
(∑
i∈[N ] r · r
)
+ (r + R)R = Nr2 + (r + R)R. Hene, the prie ofanarhy is at least
ρ(Ir,R,N) ≥
Nr(r + R) + (r + R)R
Nr2 + (r + R)R
. (5)Sine the term from (5) tends to 1 + R
r
as N → ∞, the laim follows. 3.2. Dupliation Flows and lpathsTheorem 3.2. There are examples of selsh multiast routing instanes withdupliation ows using lpaths and lateny funtions that are polynomials ofdegree at most p (with non-negative oeients) where the prie of anarhyis at least νp.Proof. Consider the instane in Figure 2. We are given one player lasswith k terminals t1, . . . , tk. The demand is 1. Note that in this example,
ν = k. The lateny funtions on the links on the upper path are identially0, and these links may be used in any diretion. The links of the form (s, tj)all have lateny funtion ξ 7−→ ξp for a xed p. A Nash equilibrium f isahieved if all players use the tree onsisting of the edges (s, t1), . . . , (s, tk).This ow has soial ost SC(f) = k.Now, a better ow f̃ is given as follows. For every j ∈ [k] let a fration of 1
kusers `injet' their ow into the upper path via the edge (s, tj). Eah of thesestrategies has lateny k 1
kp
= k1−p, beause the edge (s, tj) has ongestion 1
kand hene a lateny of 1
kp
, and this edge is ontained in k paths. Beausethere are k suh strategies, eah of them arrying 1
k
units of ow, we have asoial ost of SC(f̃) = kk1−p 1
k
= k1−p.10
Hene the prie of anarhy ρ of this instane is at least ρ ≥ SC(f)
SC( ef)
=
kkp−1 = kp. In Theorem 4.4 we will see that the same instane for onservation ows(and lpaths) has a prie of anarhy bounded by O(p). So, we have an expo-nential inrease in the prie of anarhy when we swith to dupliation. Thisis due to the muh better optimum whih takes advantage of dupliation.However, the νp bound from Theorem 3.2 says that due to unoordinatedbehavior of the players, the benet of dupliation is ompletely negleted.Summarizing, we onsidered the ases of onservation ows and lpaths avgor lmax, dupliation ows and lpaths avg or lmax, and dupliation ows and
lpaths. For these ases, the prie of anarhy  even from a worst-ase pointof view  is dependent on the network topology and the set of strategies,i.e., we an onstrut instanes with arbitrarily high pries of anarhy forsome xed lass of lateny funtions.3.3. Upper Bounds for Linear Lateny FuntionsWe onsider the following two ases: a) onservation ows and ledges, b) dupli-ation ows and lpaths. We also restrit ourselves to linear lateny funtionswith non-negative oeients, i.e.,















Proof. Let f be a Nash equilibrium and f̃ some ow. By Theorem 2.4 weget

























































































.4. Prie of Anarhy Independent of the Net-work TopologyThe proofs in this setion are based on identifying the given multiast gamewith a non-atomi ongestion game with separable latenies (separable NCGfor short). These games are well studied [8℄. We rst desribe known resultson suh games, and their onnetion to our multiast game.
12








aeSle(fe). (8)Nash equilibria, soial ost and prie of anarhy are dened as in ourmultiast games. An important point is that the fators aeS appear both inongestion and in strategy lateny. This allows us [8, Prop. 2.8℄ to write thesoial ost as SC(f) = ∑e∈E le(fe)fe.Remark 4.1. Comparing this to multiast games with dupliation ows and
lpaths, we note that they do not have this kind of symmetry. Instead, theyarry fators like the aeS (the onsumptions, in fat), but only in the deni-tion of strategy lateny. These fators do not appear in the ongestion. Aswe have seen in Setion 3.2, the lak of suh a symmetry an lead to highpries of anarhy, that may even depend on the network topology. Othervariants, like onservation ows and ledges have the onsumption as a fatorin the ongestion, but not in the strategy. Having high fators in the strat-egy and relatively small fators in the ongestion means that players hoosingthat strategy suer highly under a high ongestions on this edge, but do notontribute muh to that ongestion. This an happen in multiast with du-pliation ows and lpaths with respet to edges that serve many terminals (inthe hosen strategy).On the other hand, high fators in the ongestion but only relativelysmall fators in the strategy lateny means that although the players on thisstrategy indue a high utilization on a link, they are not harged aordingly.This an happen in multiast with onservation ows and ledges with respetto edges that serve many terminals (in the hosen strategy).These observations give rise to the question about a new, more generallass of ongestion games, in whih we have dierent fators in the strategylatenies and the ongestion. 13




l(ξ)ξ + l(βl(ξ))βl(ξ) − l(ξ)βl(ξ)
.The amazing property of separable NCGs with lateny funtions from astandard lass L is that their prie of anarhy an be upper-bounded in terms
α(L)  a parameter that is ompletely independent of the struture of S.Theorem 4.2 (Roughgarden, Tardos [8℄). Let Γ be a separable NCG withlateny funtions from the standard lass L. Then ρ(Γ) ≤ α(L).For polynomial lateny funtions the anarhy values are well-known.Corollary 4.3 ([8℄). Let Γ be a separable NCG with lateny funtions thatare polynomials of degree at most p with non-negative oeients. Then
ρ(Γ) ≤
(
1 − p(p + 1)−(p+1)/p
)−1. For linear lateny funtions, i.e., if p = 1,the quantity on the right hand side is 4
3
. For p → ∞, it is Θ( p
ln p
), yielding arough bound of O(p).The bound in Theorem 4.2 is tight in the following sense: let L be astandard lass ontaining the onstant funtions3. Then we an nd for every
ǫ > 0, a separable NCG Γ with lateny funtions from L and ρ(Γ) > α(L)−ǫ.This means that  from a worst-ase point of view  the prie of anarhy inseparable NCGs is independent of the strategy struture and the demands.4.2. Dupliation Flows and ledges, Conservation Flowsand lpathsTheorem 4.4. Let L be standard. Let I be an instane of selsh multiastrouting with lateny funtions from L, then we have ρ(I) ≤ α(L) if weonsider a) dupliation ows and use ledges, or b) onservation ows and use
lpaths.3This requirement an even be relaxed; see [8℄ for details.14
Proof. We only onsider ase a), i.e., dupliation ows and strategy laten-ies ledges, and refer to the appendix for the seond ase. The rst ase an bemodeled as a separable NCG as follows: we take the links in E as elementsand as lateny funtions for the elements we take the lateny funtions ofthe links. A strategy S is identied with E(S), so that it an be seen as asubset of the set of elements. For all e ∈ E and S ∈ S set
aeS :=
{
1 if e ∈ E(S)
0 otherwise.It is straightforward to see that this NCG is exatly the multiast game. 4.3. Equal ConsumptionsWe know that in the uniast ase ν = 1 = ν∗. We now relax this onditionto the following.
c(e, S) = c(e, T ) ∀e ∈ E ∀S, T ∈ S(e). (#)We all (#) the equal onsumption ondition. Under this ondition, we havethe following theorem. The proof of this is based on the same idea as theones in the previous setion (although it requires some more steps) and hashene been moved into the appendix.Theorem 4.5. Let L be standard. Let I be an instane of selsh multiastrouting with lateny funtions from L. Then ρ(I) ≤ α(L), if we have theequal onsumption ondition and either a) onservation ows and use ledges,or b) dupliation ows and use lpaths.An important observation is the following. Reonsider the example inFigure 2 with k = 2. Then, the equal onsumption ondition is violated forsome links by the minimum possible amount, i.e., by 1. As we have seenin Setion 3.2, this already may ause an exponential jump in the prie ofanarhy. If the equal onsumption ondition was true, we would have a prieof anarhy of O(p). But instead we have Ω(2p).5. Future WorkWe onsidered the prie of anarhy for several variants of selsh multiastrouting and pointed out some ases where the prie of anarhy depends on thenetwork topology. For most of these ases, we have lower bounds. We havealso upper bounds for linear lateny funtions in two ases. An ongoing eort15
is to nd upper bounds for other variants and more general lateny funtionsand to tighten the existing bounds. We are also interested in establishingbiriteria bounds like in [6, Se. 3.6℄. Another aim is a further study of thegeneralized ongestion games mentioned in Remark 4.1.We have seen examples with a very high prie of anarhy. This motivatesthe design of mehanisms to indue more eient equilibria, e.g., throughtaxation [3℄.Finally, we intend to leave the Wardrop model, whih assumes an innitenumber of players, and turn towards a nite number of players, as in the well-known KP-model [4℄. For uniast routing on general topologies, approahesin that diretion have been made reently [7℄.Referenes[1℄ José R. Correa, Andreas S. Shulz, and Niolás E. Stier Moses. Selshrouting in apaitated networks. Mathematis of Operations Researh,pages 961976, November 2004. URL http://olumbia.edu/~ns2224/papers/ss-apsoueMORpublished.pdf.[2℄ Philip Hartman and Guido Stampahia. On some non-linear elliptidierential-funtional equations. Ata Mathematia, 115:271310, 1966.[3℄ George Karakostas and Stavros G. Kolliopoulos. Edge priing of mul-tiommodity networks for heterogeneous selsh users. In Proeedings ofthe 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Siene(FOCS'04), 2004. URL http://www.as.mmaster.a/%7Egk/papers/fos04.pdf.[4℄ Elias Koutsoupias and Christos H. Papadimitriou. Worst-ase equi-libria. In Proeedings of the 16th International Symposium on Theo-retial Aspets of Computer Siene (STACS'99), volume 1563 of Le-ture Notes in Computer Siene, pages 404413, Marh 1999. URLhttp://www.s.berkeley.edu/~hristos/nash.ps.[5℄ Lavy Libman and Ariel Orda. Atomi resoure sharing in nonooperativenetworks. Teleommuniation Systems, 17(4):385409, 2001.[6℄ Tim Roughgarden. Selsh Routing. PhD thesis, Cornell University, May2002. URL http://theory.stanford.edu/~tim/papers/thesis.ps.[7℄ Tim Roughgarden. Selsh routing with atomi players. In Proeed-ings of the 15th Annual ACMSIAM Symposium on Disrete Algorithms16
(SODA'04), 2004. URL http://theory.stanford.edu/~tim/papers/split.ps.[8℄ Tim Roughgarden and Éva Tardos. Bounding the ineieny of equilibriain nonatomi ongestion games. Games and Eonomi Behavior, 47(2):389403, 2004. URL http://theory.stanford.edu/~tim/papers/ng.ps.AppendixA. Some Speial CasesEdge Disjoint Paths. Everything that holds for onservation ows arriesover to dupliation ows, provided we onsider strategies with edge disjointpaths (i.e., strategies S suh that for all paths P, Q ∈ S we have E(P ) ∩
E(Q) = ∅). For then, dupliation is never used.Equal Number of Terminals. Consider onservation ows, lpaths avg,and the speial ase that ki = kj for all i, j ∈ [N ], and all the ommonnumber of terminals k. We already know that onservation ows and lpathsan be modeled as a separable NCG, see Theorem 4.4. All we now have todo is replae eah le by the funtion ξ 7−→ 1k le(ξ). This does not hangethe anarhy value of the lass of used lateny funtions. On the other hand,

































= 0.Now, let f be a ow suh that (4) holds. Fix i0 ∈ [N ] and pik S0 ∈ Si0suh that
lS0(f) = min
S∈Si0





ni0 if S = S0
0 if S ∈ Si0 \ {S0}





















f(S).Beause ∑S∈Si0 f(S) = ni0 , it follows that lS(f) = li0(f) whenever f(S) > 0,





















































































S (f)f(S) = ν · SC(f).
B.4. Proof of Theorem 4.4 b)We onsider onservation ows and strategy latenies lpaths. This an bemodeled as a separable NCG in a similar way as before. We set
aeS := c(e, S) (9)for eah e ∈ E and S ∈ S. When we ompute the ongestion using (7) weget the right expression for the ongestion for onservation ows, see (1). Wealready stated in Remark 2.1 b) that lpathsS (f) = ∑e∈E(S) c(e, S)f(S). By (8)and (9) we get exatly lpaths as the strategy lateny. B.5. Proof of Theorem 4.5a) First onsider onservation ows and ledges. We will model this as a separa-ble NCG. Again, as elements we take the links in E and as lateny funtionsfor the elements we take the lateny funtions of the links. A strategy S isidentied with E(S), so that it an be seen as a subset of the set of elements.For eah e ∈ E whih lies in a path inluded in some strategy, denote by
ce the ommon value c(e, S) of all strategies S ∈ S(e). Set ce arbitrarily,e.g., ce := 0, if e is not used in any strategy. Dene new lateny funtionsfor all e ∈ E:
l̃e : R≥0 −→ R≥0, ξ 7−→ le(ceξ), (10)19
and orresponding multipliers ãeS := 1 if e ∈ E(S) and 0 otherwise.The NCG Γ̃ dened by the (l̃e)e∈E and the (ãeS)e∈E
S∈S



































S (f).The transformation in (10) preserves the anarhy value of the lass of usedlateny funtions. Hene, the bound of Theorem 4.2 holds, if we take for Lthe lateny funtions on the links of the network.b) Now onsider dupliation ows and lpaths. We proeed as above, butdene new lateny funtions for all e ∈ E:
l̃e : R≥0 −→ R≥0, ξ 7−→ cele(ξ), (11)and orresponding multipliers ãeS := 1 if e ∈ E(S) and 0 otherwise. TheNCG dened by the (l̃e)e∈E and the (ãeS)e∈E
S∈S













= lpathsS (f) by Remark 2.1 b).The transformation in (11) preserves the anarhy value of the lass of usedlateny funtions, so we an use Theorem 4.2. 20
C. Summary TableWe summarize some of our most important results on the prie of anarhyin Table 1. onservation dupliation
ledges • 43 ν2ν∗ for p = 1
• Θ( p
ln p
) (top. ond.) • 43 for p = 1• Θ( pln p)






















)Table 1: Prie of anarhy for dierent variants of multiast and latenyfuntions being polynomials of degree p with non-negative oeients. The`topologial ondition' refers to the equal onsumption ondition.
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